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Singing and Dancing with God: 
A Reply to Fratt and Beach 
By Mark S. McLeod 
206 First, I'd like to thank Professors Steven Fratt and Bradley Beach for 
replies to "Making God Dance." I find their responses helpful and stimula 
just the kind of reactions from faculty at the Christian colleges that I ho 
when writing the original essay. Let me begin with Pratt's comments, sin 
that he and I are mostly in agreement, and then move on to Beach's co 
and criticisms. I find myself, naturally, having more things to say to Beach, 
his paper is more critical of Christian Multi-world Realism. 
Fratt brings his creative insight to bear on Multi-world Realism from 
point of view of an intellectual historian. He begins his response, as hist 
should, one supposes, by placing Multi-world Realism into the context of 
particular fields. For Fratt, this is the history of recent philosophy of science 
the broader historical setting of scientific methodology. But the core of his a 
describes "a few of the practical reasons why Multi-world Realism may pro 
beneficial vantage point from which the Christian historian can understand 
mission of history at the Christian liberal arts college." 
First, Fratt notes that Multi-world Realism is compatible with Idealist 
losophies of history. One of my examples in "Making God Dance" comes f 
Mark Noll's work on philosophy of history. I suggested that his philosop 
view was, indeed, influenced by post-modern thinking. His view, neverthel 
attempts to be consistent with Common Sense Realism. I am pleased to 
another Christian historian take a position in contrast to Noll's. Natura 
believe Fratt is right in much of what he says in this section. Fratt writes that 
tradeoff between the historical certainty of positivistic histories and the resul 
dehumanization of historical agents should be reason enough for Christia 
reconsider their 'common sense' acceptance of Positivism." This way of stat 
what is at stake in Idealist vs. Common Sense Realist or Positivist views of hist 
captures, in a helpful way, at least part of what "Making God Dance" address 
In his second reason, Fratt suggests that Multi-world Realism provides 
useful model for facing the problems of the Western vs. non-Western cultu 
In his reply, Mark S. McLeod first discusses his areas of agreement with both Fratt 
Beach. Then, he gives his answer to Beach's objection to multi-world realism. Mr. McLe 
teaches philosophy at the University of Texas at San Antonio. 
y. Again, I think Fratt is helpful here. In fact, when the issue of Chris- 207 
's Review containing "Making God Dance" came out, it included two 
ssing multi-culturalism and a review essay evaluating a book on 
orities and Christian colleges. I began immediately to think of the 
between Multi-world Realism and problems in the curriculum with 
other cultures. There is, of course, much to be said on this topic, and 
tt mentions only begins the discussion. Teaching more "histories" is 
a valuable result of Multi-world Realism. But the story could continue 
ratures," "theologies," "arts," and (dare I say it?) "sciences." I'd like to 
discussion of these issues. 
notes of caution I'd add. The first is that many people in the Christian 
run together two separate, although perhaps related, problems. One is 
ght truly be called "multi-culturalism" dealing with non-Western civi-
and cultures. The other concerns seeking justice for American minority 
The two issues are not the same, and, it seems, they should not be treated 
same way. A second note goes beyond curricular concerns to recruitment of 
y and students from underrepresented groups. Multi-world Realism might 
s understand not just the histories, cultures, and subcultures of minorities 
their present fears and concerns. In other words, the difficulties facing 
an blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asians on predominately 
campuses often are not the same as those faced by non-American students 
same campuses. 
Fratt's third point calls attention to a connection between Multi-world Real-
and our human condition. While I think that Common Sense Realists can treat 
theorizing humbly, Fratt's point about how Common Sense Realism can 
to a fascination with apologetic proofs and the promise of certainty or certi-
is again, I think, close to the mark. Such a fascination is often found among 
elical students and scholars. If I may add an autobiographical note, my 
for certainty in my faith very nearly killed my faith. Such was also the case 
many of my philosophical classmates. One of the most freeing things about 
lti-world Realism for me has been the removal of the need for certainty. God's 
th reaches far beyond the apparent bounds of Common Sense Realism. 
I turn now to Beach's clear and concise comments. First, let me note an 
ment with Beach on the issue of eschatology. If there is one thing that seems 
about the results of Multi-world Realism, it is that none of us academics 
ver be out of a job in the kingdom! More seriously, I do believe that Multi-
d Realism is more faithful to a biblical picture of human creativity and the 
of humans in the kingdom. Adam did, after all, name the animals. And he 
Eve were gardeners. Both were creative tasks. 
But on to the disagreements. The first of these is fairly minor, but I think 
ortant. The question, "What sorts of theories delight God and why do they 
se God to dance?" is not, I think, "tantamount to the question, 'What is it 
displeases God?'" This is like thinking that knowing what displeases one's 
use is tantamount to knowing what pleases one's spouse. So, the answer to 
Christian Scholar's 
208 Beach's second question will not necessarily suffice to answer his first. U 
nately, the issues are more complicated than Beach proposes. In fact, it 
very difficult to say why God is pleased by one theory more than anoth 
On to the heart of the matter. In "Making God Dance," I suggested 
example, that a theory that would not delight God is one that denies God' 
tence. Beach suggests that the seemingly plausible reason for God's disap 
of such a theory is that "such theories fail to correspond with what is a 
the case." I believe that this isn't right, but before I say why, let me put it 
fully into the context of Beach's argument. 
Beach suggests that the reason God doesn't dance to theories that 
God's existence is that the statement "God does not exist" doesn't corr 
to the facts. Because of this, Beach writes, "objectivity vanishes if it is 
bound." Beach then attempts to press the following dilemma on Multi-
Realism. The notion of "corresponding to the facts" is either theory-bou 
it is not. If it is theory-bound, then in some theories, God doesn't exist ... 
source of the objectivity disappears and we are left with mere relativism 
no theory-independent God. On the other hand, if the existence of God is 
theory-bound, then there is a noumenal world, and objectivity rests in 
rather than something else, such as God's interests. 
But this does, contrary to Beach's claims in his last paragraph, misco 
Multi-world Realism. It is not that "the assumption of God's pleasure is th 
bound," as Beach suggests. It is truth (lower case) that is theory-bound. 
there are other ways of talking about God. Which brings me back to the 
point. The reason that God is not delighted with theories denying that he e 
may be something other than "lack of correspondence." God's existence could 
the best explanatory hypothesis of everything else we humans experience, a 
hence it shows up in the most interesting theories. God is thus disappointed 
theories that miss this explanation. Or perhaps God's disappointment, or lack 
enthusiasm, or even anger, is an issue of worship. God is displeased because 
owe him worship or because it is good for us to trust him. Other possibilities 
beauty or overall coherence, and so forth. God's disapproval need not be ba 
on our believing something false. 
Beach also raises the question, "Why should God value and be intere 
in one theory over another?" And he replies that "it cannot be caprice w 
determines God's pleasure, yet without factually based values such choices a 
merely divine whims." 
Again, why does God need factually based values that are, apparently, 
dependent of God? This sounds a lot like the ancient Euthyphro dilemma, 
contemporary version of which says the following. Either God commands mo 
rules without a reason, in which case morality is arbitrary, or he comma 
moral rules on the basis of some independent standard, in which case God is 
the basis of morality. But a solution to this dilemma may be God's own nat 
which is neither arbitrary nor independent of him. Of course, to talk of God' 
nature in the context of Multi-world Realism may be odd, since it sounds l' 
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of noumenal essence. But we needn't talk that way in the context of 209 
theorizing. Instead, it is plausible to suggest that God's concern is, 
with explanations, worship, coherence, beauty, and perhaps a host 
ngs as well. (This open-endedness here is one of the reasons the initial 
ns are not tantamount to the same thing.) 
may press the objectivity question again, viz., Why does God value 
things? Isn't it because of some Truth underlying them? But as I 
in the original essay, truth isn't the only important human construct. I 
now that Truth need not be the basis for value. Isn't God himself the 
alue? Values are metaphysically rooted in God himself and his creative, 
d (as opposed to some static nature). At least some values are. (Others 
ted in us-moral values, for example.) God's way of valuing things 
is the right way, simply in virtue of God's own creativity. And it 
's creativity that, according to Multi-world Realism, made us. God is the 
sings with, and dances to, giggles at, and brings toasts to, the theories 
creatures. 
'• ally, Beach brings the issue of value down to the level of us theorizers 
he says that "there is no reason for valuing what interests God unless 
interests God has some meta-theoretical basis." The reply to this claim is 
to seek, for the Multi-world Realist. Our theories are right when they 
God. And theories, including theories of value, delight God, when he 
them interesting. But God doesn't need reasons to find theories interesting. 
the very criterion of the interesting. So our reason for valuing God's inter-
just that they are God's interests. Does that sound circular? That should 
surprise. The circularity of Multi-world Realism was never hidden. But 
gh Multi-world Realism dances in circles, it doesn't dance with the devil 
